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ABSTRACT 
The paper describes a novel technique to reliably classify whether or not a train approaching a signal 
at red actually came to a stand before the signal cleared (red aspect approaches) using the data from 
conventional signalling systems. This data is limited to the times at which the signal aspect changes 
and the times at which the train enters and leaves the signalling section (‘berth’) in advance of the 
signal. Knowing the percentage of red aspect approaches is potentially important for understanding 
the likelihood of a signal being passed at danger (SPAD) at individual signals and also for normalisation 
of SPAD data, both locally and nationally, for trending and benchmarking. The industry currently uses 
the number of red aspect approaches based on driver surveys as estimates, which are considered to 
have significant shortcomings. The development of the classification model is described together with 
the validation procedures. The techniques presented in this paper allow red approach rates to be 
reliably determined without the need for complex integration of signalling system and on-train data 
recorder data. The initial study of 94 million train approaches shows that 5% of them stopped at red 
aspects. It is also highlighted that there is a large variation in the red aspect approach rates between 
signalling areas and between individual signals. SPAD risk assessment at individual signals could be 
significantly enhanced by the ability to estimate red aspect approach rates using the techniques 
described. 
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INTRODUCTION 
An event where a train passes a signal showing a red aspect without authorisation is known as a ‘signal 
passed at danger’ (SPAD). SPADs can range from minor incidents where a signal is passed by only a 
few metres to serious incidents where longer overruns give rise to the chance of collision with other 
trains. The causes of SPADs can vary widely from driver error to degraded braking performance as a 
result of low adhesion [1]. Driver error is frequently cited as a primary cause, often described in terms 
of the failure to take sufficient action at preceding warning signals (‘misread’) or failure to control the 
train on the approach to the red signal (‘misjudgement’) [2]. However, it is recognised that there are 
many underlying technical, organisational and human factors related causes which can contribute to 
the eventual failure of a driver to stop at a red signal [3, 4]. An example of this is the accident at 
Ladbroke Grove, UK, in 1999 in which there were 31 fatalities. The accident report [5] identified key 
failings in the design of the signalling system, signal sighting and driver training as causes of the 
accident. 
The essential precursor for a SPAD is that the train approached a signal showing a red aspect and that 
the signal did not clear before the train was required to stop. Knowing the number of red aspect 
approaches is fundamentally important to understand and analyse the SPAD risk of an individual signal, 
a route, a signalling area or the whole country. The number of red aspect approach could be used to 
offer a much more meaningful way to calculate SPAD risk, comparing to the currently used normaliser 
of train mileage [6]. This improved SPAD risk measure can then be used to further guide research in 
human factors, which could lead to better management of train operations and less number of SPADs. 
SPAD risk has been studied by many researchers across the world [2, 6-10]. Though [6,9,10] suggest 
that the best normaliser for SPAD risk analysis is the number of red aspect approaches, most studies 
do not normalise SPAD incidents or use train mileage as the normaliser. This is due to the lack of 
sufficient and reliable red aspect approach data. It is discussed in [6] that with the knowledge of red 
aspect approach data, which is effectively the SPAD opportunities for drivers, can be used to greatly 
improve the understanding of human error. Consequently, this could lead to developments in specific 
mitigations for common infrastructure or operational designs, and reduce the number of SPADs. The 
knowledge of red aspect approach data could also improve the current safety risk model used by the 
industry, to link SPAD risks with underlying causes [6].  
The UK railway industry currently estimates the red aspect approach rate based on driver surveys for 
various classes of train (suburban, inter-city, freight etc.) [11]. However, the number of surveys is very 
limited and only covers a small area during a short period of time. The resulting error could be large 
when extrapolating the survey results to the entire GB railway network. The other limitation is that 
both the number and the probability of red aspect approaches at individual signals can be significantly 
different.  
Background 
Network Rail, the GB infrastructure manager, provides publicly available live data feeds which give 
various information on the movement of trains [12]. At the most fundamental level, the source of the 
information used in this paper is Train Describer (TD) data. A TD is an electronic device connected to 
each signalling panel which provides a description of each train (its ‘headcode’) and which section of 
track (or ‘berth’) it currently occupies. The TD is responsible for correctly displaying the train 
movements from berth-to-berth to the signaller and for ensuring that the train’s identity is correctly 
passed to the next signaller’s panel when it leaves the current signalling area. Although this paper is 
based on UK specific data, the principles can be applied equally to the majority of modern fixed block 
track circuit based signalling systems. 
The TD messages include two classes, termed C-class and S-class messages. TD C-class messages 
record train movements between individual berths. A C-class message will be sent out each time a 
train moves from one berth to another, and includes the train headcode, the TD area in which the 
train movement occurred, the two relevant berth IDs (i.e. the ‘from’ and ‘to’ berths) and the time of 
the movement.  
S-class messages record the changes of signal aspects, and includes the signal IDs, their TD areas and 
status. The S-class data only shows whether a signal is ‘on’, showing a red aspect or ‘off’ showing a 
proceed aspect (typically single or double yellow, or green). The signal IDs and status in S-class 
messages are represented using hard coded address-bits combinations, which can only be decoded 
using a map provided by Network Rail. 
C-class messages and S-class messages can be processed and combined together to form a database 
of train approach records, details of this process can be found in [13]. During the research over 74 
million train approaches to 9,386 signals in 83 TD areas (out of 160 in the entire country) were 
collected dated from 2014-03-25 to 2015-04-09 (244 days) and these forms the basis of the analysis 
presented in this paper. There are dates without messages due to sever or receiver failures. The 
number of TD areas and signal IDs are limited by the coverage of S-class messages and the decoding 
map. However, the data still provides a good representation of the entire network, covering different 
types of routes and areas. The SPAD incidents are also available during this period and will be used in 
further research.   
These 74 million train approaches were initially separated into these following classes in [13]: 
• NRA 
The signal aspect at the end of the berth is showing a proceed aspect when the train enters the berth. 
Train approaches in this category would not stop at red aspects, as it would not approach such aspects. 
• RED:  
The signal aspect at the end of the berth is showing a red aspect when the train enters the berth. Train 
approaches in this category could be red aspect approaches if the signal cleared after the train stopped. 
However, they are not necessarily red approaches as it is common for the signal to clear whilst the 
train is occupying that berth. Developing a method to distinguish between trains which do and do not 
stop at a red signal, based on limited data, presents significant challenges. The approach taken is 
described in the following sections of this paper. 
• ERR:  
Events do not satisfy the definitions above or data is missing preventing the analysis from being carried 
out. 
Train approaches are classified as ERR if the train passes a red signal or the signal fails to switch to red 
after being passed, caused by errors in the TD messages. Train approaches are classified as NRA if the 
signal clears before the train enters the berth. These separations are described in [13]. 
Identifying red aspect approaches 
As discussed previously, being able to identify red aspect approaches can significantly improve the 
understanding and analysis of SPAD risks. However, it is very difficult to achieve due to the very limited 
information provided by a conventional signalling system. The data available for this research includes 
the TD C and S class messages which only provide timings of train moving between berths and signal 
status changes; and limited information of the length of some berths and whether a berth is at a 
platform. There is no data about the exact position or speed of trains from on-board devices such as 
GPS. 
One of the previous attempts to identify red aspect approaches is included in [14], and this method is 
based on a set of thresholds configured using railway signalling experience and knowledge. However, 
this method is not accurate and requires further refinements. 
A refined model is proposed in this paper, using an idealised speed profile method to further classify 
the RED approaches into the following sub-groups: 
• CAS (Cleared Approaching Signal): 
Signal is red when train enters berth but it clears before the train comes to a stand. It is important to 
distinguish such approaches from CSS approaches as they represent events where a SPAD cannot 
occur because the signal clears before the train reaches it. 
• CSS (Cleared Stopped (at) Signal): 
Signal clears after train has come to a stand and train departs immediately. CSS approaches are the 
essential precursor to a SPAD as the train has to come to a stand. 
• CBD (Cleared Before Departure): 
Train enters platform and stops at a red signal. The signal then clears but the train may not depart 
immediately due to completing station work. Whilst essentially the same as CSS events, a separate 
category was provided in an attempt to aid normalisation of incidents related to platform specific 
events. These include incorrect despatch against a red signal and permissive working. 
• PSS (Possibly Stopped (at) Signal): 
Signal possibly clears after train has come to a stand and train departs immediately. This class is the 
'grey area' between the CSS and CAS classes and holds train approaches which cannot be confidently 
classified as CSS or CAS using the currently available data. 
METHODOLOGY 
A typical sequence of events when a train approaches a signal is shown in Figure 1. In this example, 
the train enters berth 1 from berth 0 at time 𝑡𝑖𝑛 while signal 1 at the end of berth 1 shows red.. Signal 
0 must switch from yellow to red shortly after the train enter berth 1. Signal 1 clears at time 𝑡𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑟 
before the train passes signal 1 and leaves berth 1 at time 𝑡𝑜𝑢𝑡.  
 
Figure 1 Red Aspect Approach Sequence 
Speed profile model 
When a train approaches a red aspect, it will slow down and prepare to stop at distance in front of the 
signal, unless the signal clears before the train stops. A generic speed profile for red aspect approaches 
can be assumed to be comprised of the following stages, as shown in Figure 2: 
1. In the first stage, the train will continue to travel at a constant speed (berth entrance speed 𝑉1) 
before the train starts braking. The duration of the stage is denoted as 𝑡1. 
2. In the second stage, the train will start decelerating until it comes to stop. The duration of the 
stage is denoted as 𝑡2. 
3. In the third stage, the train will stop at the signal until it clears. The duration of the stage is denoted 
as 𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑝. 
4. In the fourth stage, the train will start accelerating shortly after the signal clears. This stage 
includes a brief lag to account for the driver’s reaction time. The duration of the stage is denoted 
as 𝑡3. 
5. In the fifth stage, the train stops accelerating and keep travelling at a constant speed (𝑉2). The 
duration of the stage is denoted as 𝑡4. 
Note a red aspect approach may not have all these 5 stages, for example the train may have already 
started decelerating at the beginning of the berth thus does not have the first stage.  
The time between train entered the berth and signal cleared is 𝑡𝑎, and 𝑡𝑎 = 𝑡1 + 𝑡2 +  𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑝. The time 
between signal cleared and train left the berth is 𝑡𝑏, and 𝑡𝑏 = 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑐𝑡 + 𝑡3 +  𝑡4. The total time the 
train spent in the berth is denoted as 𝑇, where 𝑇 = 𝑡𝑎 + 𝑡𝑏 .  
The distance the train travelled before the signal clears (during 𝑡𝑎) is the key parameter to estimate 
whether a train stopped at red aspect, therefore the following analysis will focus on the period 
between the train entering the berth and the signal clearing. 
 
Figure 2 Example Speed Profile for CSS Signal Approach 
Among the parameters used in the model, only the time points when trains entered or left berths, and 
signal status changed are available from the TD data. The lengths of some berths are also available.  
Some assumptions are required based on industrial knowledge, such as:  
 Previous work by RSSB [14] suggested that the average deceleration rate for passenger trains 
approaching red signals was 3%g, thus the deceleration rate 𝑎 = 3%𝑔.  
 Trains normally stop about 12 metres ( ∆𝑑 = 12 ) in the advance of the red aspect in 
accordance with typical GB train driving practice) [15]. 
Estimation of berth entrance speed 
The berth entrance speed (𝑉1) can be estimated statistically using all the train approaches to the berth 
in question from the TD data. 
The red aspect approach rates for individual signals vary significantly depending on the routes and 
train class [12]. Therefore, all train approaches for the berth are separated into train approach groups 
using the following parameters: 
 TD area: The TD area the train travels in. 
 Train Type: The first digit of the train head code represents the class of train. 
 Signal IDs: The signal ID the train approaches and its preceding signal ID (Signal 0 and Signal 1 as 
shown in Figure 1). 
 Three berth IDs: The berths the train steps from and to when passing Signal 0 and Signal 1 (Berth 
0, Berth1 and Berth2 as shown in Figure 1). 
If a train approach group had more than 200 RED approaches, then 𝑉1 was estimated using the fastest 
20% of RED approaches, as in these cases, the signal was likely to have cleared before the trains 
stopped. Otherwise, 𝑉1 was estimated using the slowest 20% NRA approaches, as these trains were 
likely to be proceeding under a caution aspect.  
For red aspect approaches, the train must enter the berth slow enough to stop 12 meters in rear of 
the red aspect at an average of 3%g. Thus, the maximum entrance speed for each berth can be worked 
out as: 𝑉𝑚𝑎𝑥 = √2𝑎(𝑑0 − ∆𝑑), where 𝑑0 is the length of the berth. Therefore, if a trains speed 𝑉1was 
found to exceed 𝑉𝑚𝑎𝑥 it would be set to 𝑉𝑚𝑎𝑥. 
Identification of red aspect approaches 
The first half the speed profile between the train entering the berth and signal clearing (𝑡𝑎) can be 
used to identify if the train stopped at the red aspect, with the parameters known, assumed and 
estimated in the above sections.  
The first step is to examine if the signal cleared late enough so the train could have come to a stop. 
The minimum time needed to stop from entrance speed 𝑉1 at a deceleration rate 𝑎 is 𝑉1/𝑎. Therefore, 
if 𝑡𝑎 < 𝑉1/𝑎 then the train is unlikely to have stopped at the signal and the train approach would be 
classified as CAS. It is still possible that the train did stop but this would require a much higher average 
brake rate than the norm and this would represent more ‘aggressive’ driving than found in normal 
train operation. 
Otherwise the train could stop at the red aspect, and the time it stopped 𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑝 can be worked using 
Equation 1 and Equation 2 
 
𝑑0 − ∆𝑑 = 𝑉1𝑡𝑎 −
𝑉1
2
2𝑎
− 𝑉1𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑝  Equation 1 
Thus the time stopped at the signal 𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑝 can be worked out using Equation 2: 
 
𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑝 = 𝑡𝑎 −
𝑉1
2𝑎
−
𝑑0 − ∆𝑑
𝑉1
  Equation 2 
𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑝 < 0 means that the train approach does not fit the assumed speed profile well and possibly 
stopped at the red aspect with low confidence. Therefore, such train approaches are classified as PSS. 
Among the train approaches with 𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑝 ≥ 0, the ones departing from platforms are identified as CBD 
approaches and the rest are CSS approaches. Train approaches can be separated by whether the train 
stopped at the red aspect using the formulae above, however knowledge of train entrance speed and 
the berth length is essential. Approaches without such information are classified as N/A.  
It was found that 38% of the RED approaches fell into the N/A category, i.e. they could not be classified 
using the approach speed profile method. 93% of the N/A approaches did not have berth length 
information because their preceding signal IDs could not be found, due to missing preceding berth IDs 
or lack of signal decoding map coverage. The rest of these train approaches do not have berth entry 
speed information because the number of train approaches to the signal is too small.  
Identification of red aspect approaches with less information 
To classify the N/A approaches, a classification tree algorithm was used to optimise the rules to 
separate CAS approaches from CSS approaches. No efforts were made to separate PSS and CSS as they 
cannot be separated with high confidence based on the statistical approach. This method is one of the 
most commonly used methods in data mining to predict the classification results based on several 
input variables. 80% of train approaches were used for training the classification tree and 20% of them 
were used for subsequent testing. Using this model, 84% of the testing approaches resulted in a 
classification consistent with the results of the approach speed profile model described above. 
 
Figure 3 Red approach classification tree 
The model shows that:  
 Primarily, CAS events are characterised by relatively small 𝑡𝑎 , (48 seconds) whereas red aspect 
approaches are characterised by a larger 𝑡𝑎 (92 seconds). This is because a larger 𝑡𝑎 suggests the train 
has travelled further within the berth before the signal clears thus has higher chance of stopping at 
the signal. 
 When 𝑡𝑎 is between 48 and 92 seconds, CAS events are characterised by 𝑡𝑏/𝑇 ≥ 0.29 because a 
larger 𝑡𝑏/𝑇  ratio means train travels further after the signal clears, which suggests the train was 
further away from the signal when it cleared and thus did not stop.  
The red aspect approaches identified with this classification tree model can be further divided into 
CBD and CSS/PSS classes depending on whether the train is departing from a platform. 
Summary 
A speed profile method was developed to identify if a train stopped at a red aspect based on the 
timings of trains entering and leaving each signalling berth, the timings of signal, berth lengths and 
berth-platform association. The deceleration rate and distance trains stop in rear of signals were 
assumed based on industry knowledge. The berth entrance speed was estimated using the 
information for other train approaches.  
For train approaches at berths with known lengths and entrance speed values, the red aspect 
approaches can be measured using the speed profile method. For train approaches where the berth 
length was unknown an alternative approach was developed using a classification tree. 
VALIDATION 
The separation of non-red approaches (trains that entered the berth while signal being not red at the 
end) has been successfully validated in [12] via manual calculations and comparing to the Network 
Rail’s Control Centre of the Future (CCF) software. However, as the messages are used in CCF and this 
work, it cannot be used to validate the separation between train approaching signals showing red. 
A log of signal aspects approached and the related timings with several days of cab riding in Merseyrail 
Electrics signalling area were used to validate the speed profile model proposed in this paper. 118 
signals were passed and the model correctly classified 100% of these approaches.  
On-Train Monitoring Recorders (OTMR) are devices used on trains to record data about the operation 
of train controls and performance in response to those controls, including the speed of the trains. GB 
train operator Virgin Trains provided some OTMR data from 2015-01-06 to 2015-01-10 only containing 
instances when their trains stopped at red signals. This data was used to validate the identification 
method described above. 35 OTMR records of red aspect approaches were examined, and all of them 
are correctly classified as red aspect approaches incidents (CSS, PSS or CBD). 
The future plan includes to access more OTMR data to carry out further validations, nevertheless, it 
will only ever be practical to carry out such a validation for a very small sample of the many millions 
of signal approaches in the database. 
RESULTS 
The method described above was applied to the 74 million train approaches and results of some 
typical signal-train combinations (train approach groups) as well as the overall results are presented 
in this section. 
Case Study Results 
Three train approach groups with the highest number of RED approaches within their TD areas were 
selected for this case study as listed in Table 1. These three train approach groups represent three 
different scenarios: group 1 for trains approaching a large mainline station; group 2 for low-speed 
local stopping passenger services; group 3 for local passenger trains (on the UK West Coast Mainline). 
All of these three approach groups are identified using the red aspect approaches classification model 
as described in the Methodology Section. Note the berth length and entry speed information are 
available for all of these three groups and therefore the analysis is carried out using the detailed rather 
than the simplified classification model described above. 
Group TD TD Area Train Type Berth0 Berth1 Berth2 Signal0 Signal1 
1 MP 
Manchester 
Piccadilly 
Express 
Passenger 
0064 0305 0345 MP64 MP305 
2 SS Merseyrail 
Local 
Passenger 
0104 0102 0100 ML104 ML102 
3 R1 Rugby 
Local 
Passenger 
5231 5233 9737 TK5231 TK5233 
Table 1 Train Approach Groups for Case Study 
The red aspect approach classification results for the three case study groups are shown in Figure 4, 
Figure 5 and Figure 6.  
In these three graphs, the vertical axis shows the ratio between 𝑡𝑏  and 𝑇 , which represents the 
proportion of the total berth time which each train spent in the berth after the signal cleared. When 
𝑡𝑏/𝑇 is larger than 1, the signal clears before the train enters the berth, thus it is no longer a red aspect 
approach. The horizontal axis shows the average speed of the train approaches (Berth length 𝑑0 
divided by berth time 𝑇). 
The dashed line was derived using the condition where 𝑡𝑎 ≥ 𝑉1/𝑎 and the line can be expressed as: 
 
{
𝑦 = 𝑘1𝑥 + 1
𝑘1 = −
𝑉1
𝑎𝑑0
 
 Equation 3 
The dash-dotted line was derived according to Equation 1 and can be expressed as: 
 
{
𝑦 = 𝑘2𝑥 + 1
𝑘2 = −
𝑉1
2𝑎 +
𝑑0 − 25
𝑉1
𝑑0
 
 Equation 4 
As discussed in the Methodology section, points above this line are all CAS approaches. For points 
below the dashed line, they are classified as CSS approaches if they are below the dash-dotted line, 
otherwise they are classified as PSS approaches. In cases where a train approach group has V1 <
√2a(d0 − ∆d), thus 𝑘1 < 𝑘2, no approaches in this group will be classified into the PSS group  
Figure 4 shows the classification results for train approach group 1. For this group, signal MP64 and 
MP305 are both on the down fast line approaching Manchester Piccadilly station and the line speed 
is 65 mph. The entrance speed 𝑉1 is worked out as 56 mph. The distance between these two signals is 
963 metres. Figure 4 shows an example the case where the dash-dotted line is above the dashed line, 
thus no train approaches are classified as PSS. 
 
Figure 4 Red Aspect Approach Classification: Train Approach Group 1 
Figure 5 shows the classification results for train approach group 2. Signal ML104 is the departure 
signal from Hillside station and ML102 is the approach signal for Ainsdale station. The berth entrance 
speed 𝑉1 for signal ML34 is worked out as 50 mph. The distance between these two signals is 1600 
metres. 
 
Figure 5 Red Aspect Approach Classification: Train Approach Group 2 
Figure 6 shows the classification results for train approach group 3. Signal MP5231 and MP5233 are 
both on the down slow line at Denbigh Hall North Junction. The line speed is 100 mph and the berth 
entrance speed 𝑉1 for signal MP5231 is worked out as 49 mph. The distance between these two signals 
is 1363 metres. 
 
Figure 6 Red Aspect Approach Classification: Train Approach Group 3 
Overall Results 
The left pie chart of Figure 7 shows the classification results for 74 million train approaches, where 5% 
of them are red aspect approaches and 5% of them are CAS. The 7.3 million red aspect approaches 
are further broken down on the right bar. The approaches identified by the classification tree model 
are tagged with N/A as this method is deemed to give results with a lower confidence than the 
approach speed method. 
 
Figure 7 Red Aspect Approaches Classification Results  
Figure 8 shows the distribution of CAS and red aspect approaches rates between TD areas and Signal 
IDs, the shaded area under the box plot represents the distribution density of train approaches. The 
CAS and red aspect approaches rates between TD areas are densely distributed, and half of the TD 
areas have red aspect approaches rates between 3% and 12% and the median red aspect approaches 
rate is 6%. There are areas with high red aspect approaches rates but their train approach numbers 
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Other
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are very small, due to the limited berth signal mapping information. For example, WH (West 
Hampstead Signal Box) TD area has the highest percentage of red aspect approaches at 96% but it 
only has six signals available in the database due to the coverage of the decoding information. These 
six signals are approached less than 5000 times. 
In contrast, the red aspect approaches rates by individual signal ID are more evenly distributed with 
the most of signals having red aspect approaches rates between 0% and 5%, which represent the most 
common type of signals i.e. those that are rarely approached at red. The signals with high red aspect 
approaches rate (90-100%) are probably approach control signals, platform starter signals, or depot 
exit signals which are always approached at red. 
 
Figure 8 Red Aspect Approaches Distribution by TD Area and Signal IDs 
CONCLUSION 
Trains stopping at red aspect (red aspect approaches) is a precursor for SPADs. Therefor by identifying 
red aspect approaches, this method provides the basis for a better understanding of SPAD risk at 
individual signals and for improved normalisation of SPAD data for trending and benchmarking 
nationally. A model was developed to classify red aspect approaches based on limited data available 
from the signalling system using timings of train movement, signal changes, and some lengths of 
berths etc. Though this method is developed for the UK railway signalling system, it can be modified 
and applied for all modern fixed block track circuit based signalling system around the world.  
The model was applied to 74 million train approaches in 83 TD areas. Three signals in different areas 
were used as examples demonstrating how train approaches are separated into different categories. 
The overall results showed that approximately 5% of all train approaches are red aspect approaches. 
Another 5% of trains entered the berth while the signals were showing red but did not stop because 
the signals cleared early enough. It also highlighted that there is a large variation in the red aspect 
approaches rates between individual signals and TD areas.  
The identification results were validated with a limited number of red approaches from the OTMR 
system. All of the 35 red aspect approaches incidents were correctly identified by the proposed 
method. More OTMR data will be acquired in the future to carry out further validations and 
improvements. 
Besides SPAD risk analysis, there are a number of other potential uses of the data. The analysis has 
the potential to assist with understanding performance and capacity constraints on the network. This 
could be achieved by comparing the theoretical timetable against what actually occurs and assessing 
if there are areas where operations could be optimised or designed better. 
A further use could be in understanding the routing of trains and the frequency of each route being 
used. Better knowledge of these would improve the estimates of parameters in risk models that 
account for these in their algorithms. 
The methods described in this report have been used to develop an online tool to analyse red 
approach rates at individual signals, groups of signals or all signals in the database. The tool is being 
made available to the GB railway industry through the Rail Safety and Standards Board’s (RSSB) 
website. 
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